Legalization of the OSCE? by Tomuschat, Christian
  Navigation 
CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT —  1 August, 2016 Print  0    
STRENGTHENING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE OSCE SYMPOSIUM
Legalization of the OSCE?
  By OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine [CC BY 2.0 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons
Since its inception, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), originally born as Conference 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), was kept 
apart from the realm of international law proper. In a famous 

passage of the 1975 Final Act of Helsinki, the Participating 
States specified that the instrument they had adopted was 
“not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter 
of the United Nations”. This provison was intended to 
announce publicly that the CSCE was not founded on the 
general regime of public international law, the rights and 
duties enshrined in the Final Act being anchored in “political 
commitments”, a term widely open to interpretation. 
However, the general understanding was that a possible 
breach of the obligations undertaken would not entail 
international responsibility in the classic sense, but would 
remain within the category of an unfriendly act. The 
reservation was consistently reiterated in later OSCE 
instruments.
Obviously, the architecture thus created was appropriate for 
a diplomatic conference which does not have any legal 
existence of its own, but is simply made up of national 
delegations. Difficulties arose as soon as the CSCE started 
solidifying itself, establishing headquarters and sending 
missions to participating States in the fulfilment of its tasks. 
In 1994, the name of the “entity” was changed from 
“Conference” to “Organization”, but this purely semantic 
amendment did not touch upon substance and therefore did 
not alleviate the actual problems encountered in practice. In 
order to be able to discharge their functions effectively 
without any undue pressure, members of the OSCE 
personnel and members of OSCE missions sent abroad need 
some kind of diplomatic privileges and immunities, in 
particular immunity from criminal prosecution. Domestic 
courts and tribunals are unable to grant extraordinary 
treatment of such kind to a person if no specific legal rule so 
provides. To date, no such general regime has been 
established for the OSCE. Only ten countries have enacted 
domestic statutes reserving for the OSCE and the persons 
acting on its behalf special rules closely resembling the 
relevant rules applicable to diplomatic intercourse. In 
another 17 States some specific OSCE structures and their 
members enjoy legal status, privileges and immunities. 
Amazingly, however, no less than 30 States have simply 
abstained from providing any legal assistance in that respect, 
which means that any mission related to their area of 
jurisdiction requires careful legal preparation, possibly the 
conclusion of special agreements.
Legalization as key to existing problems?
When in 1992 a CSCE Conference decided to establish the 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration it was self-evident from 
the very outset that a genuine international treaty would be 
required for its effective functioning. Judgments meant to be 
binding cannot derive their authority from “political 
commitments”. The Stockholm Convention resulting from 
that decision has by now received 34 ratifications, the last 
one from Montenegro only recently in April 2016. In spite of 
its perfect legal design, however, the Court has lain dormant 
for more than 20 years.
Many problems would be settled if the Participating States 
could agree on legalizing the status of the OSCE in general 
terms, providing it with an unchallengeable legal basis. In 
particular, the immunity issue would be resolved for good. In 
addition, if the legal personality of the OSCE were 
recognized, the OSCE could conclude treaties at the 
international level and would also acquire full capacity to act 
as a person under private law, thus getting rid of many 
bureaucratic difficulties. A full draft was presented by the 
Irish chairmanship in 2012 – but has found little official 
interest although a working group continues its activity.
The advantage of great flexibility
No firm answer can be given as to the usefulness of a 
strategy to continue the search for a general overhaul of the 
soft-law foundations of the OSCE. One of its great 
advantages is its great flexibility, which sets almost no 
statutory limitations to its field of activity. Currently, as far as 
the breadth of its tasks is concerned, the OSCE resembles, at 
the European level, to a large extent the United Nations with 
its world-wide mandate – albeit with drastically reduced 
powers. Probably, some Participating States would seek to 
reduce its scope of competence before even considering 
consenting to the legalization sought. Inevitably, at the same 
time, discussion would have to be relaunched on the 
modalities of decision taking. Should the rule of consensus or 
consensus minus one then be formalized? No international 
organization proper operates under the rule of unanimity. If 
finally agreement should have been reached on a draft treaty, 
one would incur the risk of an endless ratification process, 
only a certain percentage of the Participating States 
depositing their instruments of ratification as expected while 
the others might simply wait for long years – or forever. How 
should the clause on the entry into force of the new 
instrument be framed, following the model of modern 
multilateral treaties that generally provide for a certain 
minimum level of ratifications, or should the consensus rule 
– or the strict rule of consent? – be chosen, conferring a 
right of veto to every single Participating State? Eventually, 
one might be faced with a split OSCE – the old politically 
based organization and a new shiny organization, but without 
the requisite support from the States parties, existing side by 
side. Such a split organization would be a weakened actor 
from the very outset, incapable of performing its role as a 
mediator in European politics.
In sum, it appears that the full legalization of the OSCE might 
be a futile endeavour. The transformation process, if it is 
deemed worthwhile being pursued, should for the time being 
be confined to the issue of the immunities granted to the 
personnel and the missions of the OSCE where genuine 
needs have arisen. The Participating States have a legal and 
moral duty to protect those working on the OSCE’s behalf, 
often risking their personal integrity.
Christian Tomuschat is emeritus professor of public 
international law and European law at the Humboldt 
University in Berlin
ISSN 2510-2567
Tags: Collective security , International Organisations
Print Facebook Twitter Email   
Related
OSCE: Do we really 
need an international 
legal personality and 
why?
Legal personality for 
the OSCE?
Basing the Legal Status 
of the OSCE on 
Participating States’ 
Duty of Loyalty
15 August, 2016
In "Strengthening the 
Legal Framework of 
the OSCE"
8 August, 2016
In "Strengthening the 
Legal Framework of 
the OSCE"
3 August, 2016
In "Strengthening the 
Legal Framework of 
the OSCE"
PREVIOUS POST
No Comment
Leave a reply 
Logged in as ajv2016. Log out?
SUBMIT COMMENT
 Notify me of follow-up comments by email.
 Notify me of new posts by email.
Between Aspirations and Realities 
NEXT POST
Basing the Legal Status of the OSCE on 
Participating States’ Duty of Loyalty 

Copyright © 2016 · | ISSN 2510-2567 | Impressum & Legal    
